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Abstract
This paper attempts to answer the question whether neural network pruning can be used as
a tool to achieve differential privacy without losing much data utility. As a first step towards
understanding the relationship between neural network pruning and differential privacy, this
paper proves that pruning a given layer of the neural network is equivalent to adding a certain
amount of differentially private noise to its hidden-layer activations. The paper also presents
experimental results to show the practical implications of the theoretical finding and the key
parameter values in a simple practical setting. These results show that neural network pruning
can be an effective alternative to adding differentially private noise for neural networks.
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1 Introduction
Data privacy has become one of the top concerns in machine learning with deep neural networks,
since there is an increasing demand to train deep net models on distributed, private data sets. For
example, hospitals are now training their automated diagnosis systems on private patients’ data
[LST+16, LS17, DFLRP+18]; and advertisement providers are collecting users’ online trajectories
to optimize their learning-based recommendation algorithm [CAS16, YHC+18]. These private data,
however, are usually decentralized in nature, and policies such as the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [Act96] and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [Leg18]
restrict the exchange of raw data among distributed users.
Various schemes have been proposed for privacy sensitive deep learning with distributed private
data, where model updates [KMY+16] or hidden-layer representations [VGSR18] are exchanged
instead of the raw data. However, recent research identified that even if the raw data are kept
private, sharing the model updates or hidden-layer activations can still leak sensitive information
about the input, which we refer to as the victim. Such leakage can be: the victim’s class, the
victim’s feature [FJR15], or even its original record [MV15, DB16, ZLH19]. Privacy leakage poses
a severe threat to individuals whose private records have been collected to train the deep neural
network.
Differential privacy (DP) [DMNS06] has emerged, during the past few years, as a standard
framework to analyze privacy leakage. The core idea of achieving differential privacy is to add
controlled noise to the output of a deterministic function. However, there is a long standing trade-
off in adding noise to preserve privacy: as privacy leakage decreases, accuracy decreases too. For
data without strong signals, an alternative that satisfies privacy guarantees without decreasing
accuracy is strongly desired.
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Figure 1: Visualization of inverted MNIST inputs from the Conv5 layer of LeNet-5 using the
inversion algorithm in Section 4.2. We prune the network with different target sparsity, shown in
caption (sparsity = the fraction of weights we set to 0). Pruning with higher sparsity seems to leak
less information about the input.
In this work, we attempt to answer the question whether neural network pruning can be such
an alternative. Two observations motivate this question. First, pruning perturbs a neural network,
which is somewhat similar to adding noise. Figure 1 shows that neural network pruning makes
the inversion from hidden-layers harder as the sparsity of the pruned network increases. Second,
[HMD16, LKD+17] showed that they were able to prune a large percentage (e.g. 90%) of the
weights in several commonly used neural networks without reducing accuracy.
The approach taken in this paper is to prove the existence of an equivalence between pruning
and adding differentially private noise. By doing so, one can analyze privacy leakage of network
pruning using the framework of differential privacy. We have focused on a distributed learning
setting in which a hidden-layer of activations will be used to communicate among distributed sites.
Thus, our study explores the equivalence between neural network pruning and adding differentially
private noise to activations from both theoretical and experimental perspectives.
The paper makes four contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
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that draws a connection between neural network pruning and differential privacy from a theoretical
perspective.
Second, we show that magnitude-based pruning algorithm is differentially private, if the width
of the neural network is sufficiently wide. (see Section 3).
Third, we show that in a synthetic setting with a practical differential budget, the width of the
neural network needs to be only a few hundreds in order to make the theoretical equivalence hold
(see Section 4).
Finally, our experiments with MNIST and CIFAR-10 show that, with the same target accuracy,
magnitude pruning preserves substantially more privacy than adding random noise (the classical
way to provide differential privacy) to neural network.
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents some backgrounds
about differential privacy and neural network pruning. Section 3 states our main theoretical result
which shows the equivalence between differential privacy and magnitude-based pruning. Section 5
covers relevant work in different privacy and neural network pruning, and also provides the intuition
for possible connections between them from a perspective of sparse recovery. In Section 4, we run
experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets and observe that the experimental results match
our theoretical findings. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 6.
Appendix A presents several basic probability tools. Appendix B states some applications of
concentration inequalities. Appendix C states some anti-contraction result and its generalization.
Appendix D discusses about sensitivity. Appendix E finally proves our main result. Appendix F
show several more experimental results.
2 Backgrounds
Notations. For a positive integer n, we use [n] to denote set {1, 2, · · · , n}. For vector x ∈ Rn,
we use ‖x‖1 to denote
∑n
i=1 |xi|, ‖x‖2 to denote (
∑n
i=1 x
2
i )
1/2, ‖x‖∞ to denote maxi∈[n] |xi|. We
use N (µ, σ2) to denote random Gaussian distribution. For a matrix A, we use ‖A‖ to denote its
spectral norm.
This section presents some backgrounds before theoretically establishing the equivalence be-
tween magnitude-based pruning and adding differentially private noise in Section 3. Section 2.1
revisits the notion of (dp, δdp)-differential privacy. Section 2.2 describes the magnitude pruning
algorithm.
2.1 Differential privacy
The classical definition of differential privacy is shown as follow:
Definition 2.1 ((dp, δdp)-differential privacy [DKM
+06]). For a randomized function h(x), we say
h(x) is (dp, δdp)-differential privacy if for all S ⊆ Range(h) and for all x, y with ‖x− y‖1 ≤ 1
Pr
h
[h(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(dp) · Pr
h
[h(y) ∈ S] + δdp.
Definition 2.1 says that, if there are two otherwise identical records x and y, one with privacy-
sensitive information in it, and one without it, and we normalize them such that ‖x − y‖1 ≤ 1.
Differential Privacy ensures that the probability that a statistical query will produce a given result
is nearly the same whether its conducted on the first or second record. Parameters (dp, δdp) are
called the privacy budget, and smaller dp and δdp provide a better differential privacy protection.
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Algorithm 1 Stochastic Gradient Descent with Magnitude-based Pruning, simplified version of
Algorithm 2
1: procedure SGDMagPrune(D, a)
2: W (1) is a random init. of neural network’s weights
3: for t = 1→ Ttrain + Tprune do . Training stage
4: Sample (x, y) ∼ D uniformly at random
5: if t ∈ Tprune then . Pruning stage
6: W˜ (t) ← ThPrune(W (t), a(t))
7: end if
8: Update W (t+1) based on W˜ (t) and gradient
9: end for
10: Tend ← Ttrain + Tprune
11: W˜ (Tend) ← ThPrune(W (Tend), a(Tend))
12: end procedure
13: procedure ThPrune(W,a)
14: (W˜l)i,j ← (Wl)i,j · 1|(Wl)i,j |>a, ∀i, j
15: return W˜
16: end procedure
One can think of a setting where both parameters are 0, then the chance of telling whether a query
result is from x or from y is no better than a random guessing.
A standard strategy to achieve differential privacy is by adding noise to the the original data x
or the function output h(x). In order to analyze it, we need the following definition:
Definition 2.2 (Global Sensitivity [DMNS06]). Let f : Rn → Rd, define GSp(f), the `p global
sensitivity of f , for all x, y with ‖x− y‖1 ≤ 1 as
GSp(f) = sup
x,y∈Rn
‖f(x)− f(y)‖p.
The global sensitivity of a function measures how ‘sensitive’ the function is to slight changes in
input. The noise needed for differential privacy guarantee is then calibrated using some well-known
mechanisms, e.g., Laplace or Gaussian [DR14], and the amount of noise (the standard deviation of
the noise distribution) is proportional to the sensitivity, but inversely proportional to the privacy
budget dp. That is to say, for a given function with fixed global sensitivity, a larger amount of
noise is required to guarantee a better differential privacy (one with a smaller budget dp).
2.2 Magnitude-based pruning
Procedure SGDMagPrune (see Algorithm 1) describes the process of training a deep neural
network with stochastic gradient descent and magnitude-based pruning.
As shown, the procedure begins with a standard training stage of Ttrain iterations (line 3 to
line 9). After that, the model enters the pruning stage of Tprune iterations (line 5 to line 9). Inside
each iteration of the pruning stage, we firstly perform a layer-wise threshold pruning (see procedure
ThPrune in Algorithm 1) which sets the weights with magnitudes smaller than a to zero. Then,
we run model update once. At the end of the prune stage, we perform a layer-wise pruning again
to guarantee that the resulted weight matrix achieves a certain sparsity (fraction of zeros).
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Note that inside each pruning iteration above, we perform magnitude pruning with the threshold
a(t). In practice, a(t) is determined by three factors: the target sparsity of the matrix after pruning,
the total number of pruning iterations Tprune, and the current number of pruning iterations t.
Since the proof only cares about the final state of the weight matrix, we leave the details of how to
dynamically configure a(t) to the experiment section.
3 Main result
We start by formulating the equivalence between pruning and adding differentially private noise.
We propose the following notion to describe the closeness between a randomized function and a
given function (either randomized or deterministic).
Definition 3.1 ((ap, δap)-close). For a pair of functions g : Rd → Rm and h : Rd → Rm, and a
fixed input x, we say g(x) is (, δ)-close to h(x) if and only if,
Pr
g,h
[
1√
m
‖g(x)− h(x)‖2 ≤ 
]
≥ 1− δ.
(ap, δap)-closeness basically requires that, the root-mean-square error of two functions’ output
with a given input is small enough.
Now we present our main theoretical result.
Theorem 3.2 (Informal of Theorem E.1). For a fully connected neural network (each layer can
be viewed as f(x) = φ(Ax+ b)), where ‖x‖2 = 1 and x ∈ Rd≥0. Applying magnitude-based pruning
on the weight A ∈ Rm×d (where each Ai,j ∼ N (0, σ2A)) gives us A˜ ∈ Rm×d. There exists a function
h(x) satisfying two properties :
1. h(x) is (dp, δdp)-differential privacy on input x;
2. h(x) is (ap, δap)-close to g(x) = φ(A˜x+ b).
where m = Ω(poly(1/ap, log(1/δap), log(1/δdp))) and σA = O(dpδdp/(m
2)).
In the above theorem, we should think of m as the width of the neural network, and d as the
input data dimension. φ is the activation function, e.g., φ(z) = max{z, 0}.
Regarding the two properties of h(x), property 1 requires h(x) to provide (dp, δdp)-differential
privacy, and property 2 requires that h(x) is ‘equivalent’ to magnitude-based pruning with the
predefined (ap, δap)-close notation.
Proof Sketch We use A˜ ∈ Rm×d to denote the weight matrix after magnitude-based pruning,
and A = A˜−A ∈ Rm×d. We define a noise vector e ∈ Rm as follows:
e = Lap(1, σ)m ◦ (Ax).
The main proof can be split into two parts.
Claim 3.3. Let h(x) = f(x) + e ∈ Rm, we can show that h(x) is (dp, δdp)-differential privacy.
Claim 3.4. For sufficiently large m, we have
Pr
[ 1√
m
‖e−Ax‖2 ≥ ap
]
≤ δap.
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Figure 2: Distribution of weight magnitude (over all LeNet-5 convolution layers) after training and
pruning on MNIST.
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Figure 3: Distribution of weight magnitude (over all VGG-19 convolution layers) after training and
pruning on CIFAR-10.
To prove Claim 3.3, we show by the definition of differential privacy, for any inputs x and y
with ‖x− y‖ ≤ 1,
Pr
h
[h(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp(dp) · Pr[h(y) ∈ S] + δdp.
To be more specific, we use the fact of e sampled from the Laplace distribution, and bound the
ratio ph(h(x)=t∈S)ph(h(y)=t∈S) , where p(·) denotes probability density. To bound the above ratio: first we need
to derive and upper-bound the global sensitivity (see Appendix D) of a single-layer neural network.
Then, we extend the famous anti-concentration result by Carbery and Wright [CW01] to a more
general setting (see Appendix C). To the best of our knowledge, this generalization is not known
in literature. Once the densities are bounded, integrating p(·) yields the requirement of differential
privacy, thus complete the proof of part 1.
To prove Claim 3.4, we firstly define zi = ei− (Ax)i. Then we apply the concentration theorem
(see Appendix B) to show that for any ‖x‖2 = 1 and x ∈ Rd+,
Pr
[ 1
m
|
m∑
i=1
(zi − E[zi])| ≥ 2ap
]
≤ δap,
which completes the proof of Claim 3.4.
4 Experiments
This section presents experimental results related to our main theoretical finding in Section 3. The
experiments aim to answer the following questions:
1. With the same utility (test accuracy) requirement, does neural network pruning preserve
more privacy compared with adding noise? If yes, how much more?
2. Given a privacy budget (dp, δdp), how large m should be to guarantee an (ap, δap)-closeness
between neural network pruning and adding noise?
4.1 Experimental setup
Datasets and networks. We have conducted image classification experiments on MNIST [LCB10]
and CIFAR-10 [Kri09] datasets.
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Figure 4: Sparsity-step curve during the pruning stage with gradual pruning mechanism applied.
The network architectures used are LeNet-5 [LBBH98] for MNIST, and VGG-19 [SZ15] for
CIFAR-10. All models are trained on 4 Nvidia Tesla K80 GPUs using Tensorflow [AAB+16]. We
test these two simple and standard architectures in order to better match the setting described in
our theoretical result. A detailed description of network architectures and hyper-parameters can
be found in the Appendix F.
Pruning. Our experiments have employed the gradual pruning technique introduced in [ZG17],
where over n iterations starting from t0 with interval ∆t, the sparsity is increased from an initial
sparsity value k0 (0 in our case) to a target sparsity value kT such that,
for t ∈ {t0, t0 + ∆t, . . . , t0 + n∆t}:
kt = kT + (k0 − kT ) (1− (t− t0)/(n ·∆t))3
Figure 4 shows sparsity-step curves to illustrate how to achieve a target sparsity. Figure 2 and 3
show the final weight distribution across all layers after applying gradual magnitude-based pruning.
4.2 Test of privacy leakage as an inversion attack
Since there is no standard way to quantify privacy preservation, we have used the method that
with a given attack, we will measure how much “privacy leakage” a particular approach will suffer.
We have introduced the following pipeline to measure the privacy leakage in the neural network.
Let us conceptualize the mapping from the input to the hidden-layer output in a neural network
as a representation function. For a public representation function Φ : Rd → Rm, we perturb Φ to
get Φ′ : Rd → Rm, and keep Φ′ private. We use the following attack [MV15] to test the potential
privacy leakage of using Φ′ as the representation function on any input x:
Given a perturbed representation Φ′0 = Φ′(x), and the public function Φ, the attacker’s goal is
to find the preimage of Φ′(x), namely
x∗ = arg min
x∈Rd
L(Φ(x),Φ′0) + λR(x)
where the loss function L is defined as
L(a, a′) = ‖a− a′‖22,
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(a) Test accuracy of LeNet-5 trained on MNIST with
different sparsity levels.
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Figure 5: Demonstration of test accuracy of LeNet-5 on MNIST (a), and test accuracy of VGG-19
on CIFAR-10 (b).
λ > 0 is the regularization parameter, and the regularization function R in our case is the total
variation of a 2D signal
R(a) =
∑
i,j
((ai+1,j − ai,j)2 + (ai,j+1 − ai,j)2)1/2.
Answering Question 1 requires the testing of the inversion attack against two different pertur-
bations Φ′:
• Φ′noise(x) = Φ(x) + e, where e is a Laplace noise
• Φ′prune(x) = Φ˜(x), where Φ˜ stand for magnitude-based pruning on layers of Φ
The following describes how to quantitatively measure the leakage with the defined inversion
attack.
Measurements of privacy leakage under attack Let us denote the preimage of Φ′(x) obtained
from the inversion attack as x∗, and the original image as x. If Φ′ has a strong differential privacy
guarantee, namely dp is sufficiently small, then the attacker’s chance of finding x as the preimage
of Φ′(x) will only be marginally better than random guessing. This observation motivates us to
use the closeness between x∗ and x as an indicator for privacy leakage. In experiments, we adopt
the following four metrics to measure the similarity, or closeness between x∗ and x:
• Normalized structural similarity index metric (SSIM). SSIM is a perception-based metric that
considers the similarity between images in structural information, luminance and contrast.
The detailed calculation can be found in [WBS+04]. We normalize SSIM to take value range
[0, 1] (original SSIM takes value range [−1, 1]).
• SIFT similarity (SIFT). We first calculate SIFT [Low04] keypoints and descriptors K∗ and K
based on x∗ and x. Then, we search for matched pairs between K∗ and K, and compute the
distance of each matched pair. We then filter the good matched pairs based on the distance,
and calculate # matched good pairs# matched pairs .
• Normalized complementary pHash distance (HASH). We first use a 64-bit perceptual hashing
[Zau10] function H(·) to get hashes for x∗ and x. Then we calculate the Hamming distance
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d(·) between H(x∗) and H(x). The normalized complementary pHash distance is then defined
to be (64 − dham(H(x∗), H(x)))/64. This metric captures the global similarity between x∗
and x.
• Inference accuracy (INFE). We run the inference of f(W,x∗), and then calculate the accuracy:
1y=f(W,x∗), where y is the label of x. This metric measures whether x
∗ contains the ‘class’
information of x.
For all four metrics above, a larger value indicates a higher similarity between x∗ and x.
4.3 Magnitude-based pruning vs. differential privacy
Now we report our experimental results that strongly suggest that magnitude-based pruning pre-
serves more privacy (suffer less leakage) than adding differentially private noise.
Utility of pruned networks. Figure 5(a) and (b) show the accuracy results on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 of corresponding networks pruned by the gradual magnitude-based pruning algorithm
at different sparsity levels.
The task on MNIST achieves the same level of accuracy as the network model without pruning
when the sparsity level is ≤ 0.5 (0.5 means 50% of the weights in a network are zeros). Its accuracy
gradually decreases as the sparsity level increases. The test with CIFAR-10 maintains the same
accuracy as or better than the model without pruning when the sparsity level is ≤ 0.8, and then
gradually decreases.
Note that our accuracy results at higher sparsity levels are lower than those reported in
[HMD16]. There are two hypotheses. First, our experiment used a gradual pruning algorithm for
speed which may introduce some accuracy losses. Second, as suggested by [GEH19], magnitude-
based pruning with different layer-wise sparsity (as [HMD16] did) yields better accuracy than
pruning layers with the same target sparsity as in our case.
However, for answering the question if network pruning achieves better utility than differential
privacy for the same targeted accuracy, our experiments can be viewed as conservative results.
Relative privacy leakage. To answer Question 1, we need to compare the privacy leakage of
applying magnitude-based pruning (Φ′prune) and adding differentially private noise (Φ′noise) while
requiring them to yield the same test accuracy. Specifically, we tune the amount of noise in Φ′noise
to make applying Φ′prune and Φ′noise yield the same test accuracy. We then run the inversion attack
defined in Section 4.2 on Φ′prune and Φ′noise, and measure the closeness between the inverted sample
x∗ and the original sample x.
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the privacy leakage differences between magnitude-based pruning
and adding differentially private noise for the experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively.
Given a certain layer, we have executed the inversion attack on 100 randomly chosen images, and
calculated the average score of each metric between the original images and the inverted ones.
We also report the value range. The sub-figures (a), (b), (c), and (d) of both figures show the
similarity curves of the four metrics for conv5 layer in the MNIST and CIFAR-10 experiments.
The full version with multiple layers can be found in Appendix F.
These results show that for the same accuracy, there are substantial gaps between magnitude-
based pruning and adding differential private noise in terms of the similarity measures between
inversion and original images, which suggest that neural network pruning preserve much more
privacy than adding noise.
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(e) Inverted MNIST digit from Conv5 layer with pruning (1st row) or adding noise (2nd row)
Figure 6: Privacy leakage of pruning and adding noise measured by similarity between inversion
and original images (a) - (d), obtained from Conv5 layer from LeNet-5 trained on MNIST. Shadow
represents the value range (we didn’t report the value range for INFE, because it always has 0 as
minimum and 1 as maximum). Vertical dashed lines match the accuracy; horizontal dashed lines
match the privacy leakage (similarity between inverted and original images). Also visualization of
inverted digits from layers with pruning or adding noise (e). Sparsity (k) is annotated.
Take CIFAR-10 (see Figure 7) as an example. When adding noise and pruning achieve the
same similarity (drawing vertical lines on the graph), the privacy leakage (measured as similarity) of
Φ′prune is always smaller than that for Φ′noise, which suggests that with the same utility requirement,
pruning helps preserve more privacy than adding noise. This observation gives us a clear ‘yes’ to
Question 1. If viewed from a different perspective, say matching the privacy leakage instead of
accuracy, which can be interpreted as drawing horizontal lines on the graph, pruning always yields
a higher accuracy (∼ 10% as shown in Figure 7) than adding differentially private noise.
To visually demonstrate the gap between the two approaches, Figure 6(e) and 7(e) show the
inversions from Φ′prune and Φ′noise with their accuracy matched. For LeNet-5 trained on MNIST (see
Figure 6(e)), inverted digits from Φ′noise still leak much structural information of the original image,
while inversion from Φ′prune are more vague (see sparsity smaller than 0.5), or even unidentifiable
(see sparsity larger than 0.9). Inverted images from VGG-19 layers trained on CIFAR-10 share
consistent observations. This implies that with the same accuracy, pruning may preserve more
privacy than adding noise.
4.4 Width vs accuracy
In this section, we aim to answer Question 2 by testing in a synthetic setting. We show that an
m of order 103 may be sufficient to give the equivalence in Theorem 3.2 with a realistic privacy
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(e) Inverted CIFAR-10 image from Conv5-1 layer with pruning (1st row) or adding noise (2nd
row)
Figure 7: Privacy leakage of pruning and adding noise measured by similarity between inversion and
original images (a) - (d), obtained from Conv5-1 layer from VGG-19 trained on CIFAR-10. Shadow
represents the value range (we didn’t report the value range for INFE, because it always has 0 as
minimum and 1 as maximum). Vertical dashed lines match the accuracy; horizontal dashed lines
match the privacy leakage (similarity between inverted and original images). Also visualization of
inverted digits from layers with pruning or noise (e). Sparsity (k) is annotated.
budget.
Theorem 3.2 indicates that with a sufficiently large m, we can always draw an equivalence
between adding differentially private noise and applying magnitude-based pruning. However, the
theorem is based on the worst-case analysis, and does not provide implications for average cases.
Also, it is usually infeasible to have a large m (say, larger than 105) in real-world applications. In
order to bridge the gap between the theory and the practice, we reproduce the setup of Theorem
3.2, and test how large m needs to be for a synthetic setting.
Specifically, our test is based on a single layer neural network denoted as f(x) = φ(Ax + b),
where A ∼ N (0, σA)m×d and φ(a) = max(a, 0) is the ReLU activation function. We generate x
from the folded Gaussian distribution, and normalize them such that ‖x‖2 = 1. For simplicity of
test, we set the bias term b to be 0.
Our goal is to figure out that, given a target sparsity k, how large m needs to be to guarantee
an (ap, δap)-closeness (see Definition 3.1) between the following two perturbations on f(x):
• Adding (dp, δdp)-differentially private noise e to f(x): h(x) = f(x) + e
• Applying magnitude-based pruning on A and get A˜: g(x) = φ(A˜x+ b)
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k vs m 10 20 50 100 200 500 1000 1500
0.1 0.0692 0.0289 0.0270 0.0225 0.0166 0.0126 0.0108 0.0092
0.2 0.0688 0.0277 0.0268 0.0219 0.0170 0.0128 0.0109 0.0095
0.3 0.0740 0.0266 0.0275 0.0218 0.0172 0.0128 0.0107 0.0088
0.4 0.0641 0.0245 0.0256 0.0213 0.0156 0.0116 0.0105 0.0095
0.5 0.0628 0.0204 0.0284 0.0191 0.0149 0.0114 0.0105 0.0085
0.6 0.0623 0.0224 0.0309 0.0214 0.0146 0.0120 0.0103 0.0079
0.7 0.0564 0.0204 0.0307 0.0207 0.0151 0.0111 0.0094 0.0074
0.8 0.0450 0.0303 0.0301 0.0198 0.0133 0.0096 0.0074 0.0065
0.9 0.0305 0.0249 0.0210 0.0140 0.0119 0.0079 0.0056 0.0053
Figure 8: Error ( 1√
m
‖h(x) − g(x)‖2) with different sparsity k and neural network width m. For
each k (each row), the value with blue background indicates the first time that error goes below
0.05 when we increase m, and the ones with green background is for the first time that error goes
below 0.01. Best viewed in color.
where e = Lap(1, σ)m ◦ (A˜−A)x.
Usually, an dp ≤ 1 is sufficient for privacy-sensitive applications. Thus in the test, we set the
privacy budgets to be dp = 0.5, δdp = 0.1 for simplicity. We run tests for 9 sparsity levels (from
0.1 to 0.9 with interval 0.1), and vary m to measure the closeness between h(x) and g(x), namely
ap =
1√
m
‖h(x)− g(x)‖2. The results are shown in Figure 8. As can be seen, for all sparsity levels,
m = 20 is sufficient to satisfy an ap = 0.05. To guarantee a stronger closeness of ap = 0.01, we
can increase m accordingly to 500 for sparsity levels higher than 0.8, and to 1500 for lower ones.
This suggests that in practice, m of order 103 will be sufficient given the equivalence in Theorem
3.2.
5 Related work
Pruning algorithms for neural network Traditional deep neural network models are compu-
tationally expensive and memory intensive, which hinders their deployment in applications with
limited memory resources or strict latency requirements. Many progress has been made to perform
model compression in deep networks, including low-rank factorization [SKS+13, LGR+15], network
pruning [LDS90, SB15, HMD16, LKD+17], and knowledge distillation [HVD15, CCY+17]. Among
them, neural network pruning has been widely adopted because it is able to reduce model sizes by
up to one order of magnitude without significant accuracy loss. The idea of network pruning dates
back to the Optimal Brain Damage in 1990s [LDS90]. Recently, it has been shown that removing
the weights with low magnitude can also achieve a highly compressed model [HMD16], which is
referred to as ‘magnitude-based pruning’. A recent work by Zhu, Liu, and Han [ZLH19] empirically
observed that pruning neural network gradients helps alleviate privacy leakage without much utility
loss. However, they did not provide theoretical explanation.
Differential privacy for deep learning The concept of -differential privacy was originally
introduced by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith [DMNS06]. Later, it was generalized to a
relaxation of (, δ)-differential privacy [DKM+06, Dwo09, DR14]. Differential privacy has been
successfully applied to many problems. For more detailed surveys of the applications of differential
privacy, we refer the readers to [Dwo08, Dwo11].
Applying differential privacy techniques in deep learning is an interesting but non-trivial task.
Previous research have customized differential privacy for different learning tasks and settings
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[SS15, ACG+16, PWWD16].
However, most of these approaches still use the standard mechanism of adding noise to satisfy
differential privacy, while this work aims to draw an interesting connection between differential
privacy and neural network pruning.
Neural network inversion and sparse recovery The problem of inverting a neural network
is to find the input data point x ∈ Rd that yields a given hidden-layer output y ∈ Rm under
the assumption that weight matrix A ∈ Rm×d is known. Approaches for neural network inversion
generally fall into two categories: by sampling and back-propagation [LK94, JRM+99, LKN99,
VKR05, MV15], and by learning a decoder network to invert [Bis95, DB16]. Arora, Liang and
Ma [ALM15] suggests from a theoretical perspective that it is possible to construct and train a
generative model which is the reverse of the feedforward network. [LJDD19] studied how to invert
deep generative model. More specifically, they show that for some realizable case, single layer
inversion can be performed exactly in polynomial, by solving a linear program. Further, they show
that for multiple layers, inversion is NP-hard.
The task of inverting a single-layer linear neural network is intrinsically similar to the classic
notion of sparse recovery [CRT06, Don06, GLPS10, HIKP12, IK14, Kap16, Kap17, NS19, NSW19],
which aims to reconstruct an approximately k-sparse vector x ∈ Rd from linear measurements
y = Ax, where A ∈ Rm×d. Note that in sparse recovery context, sparsity denotes the number of
non-zero entries, which is the opposite to what people use in the pruning community. To connect
neural network inversion with sparser recovery, one can think of the single-layer linear network’s
weight matrix as A, the hidden-layer output as y, and the network input as x. In the linear case, it
is known that in order to achieve the sparse recovery task, the column sparsity of the sensing matrix
A has non-trivial lower bound [NN13]. That is to say, for a single-layer linear neural network, given
the hidden-layer output y = Ax, we need A to have at least some fraction of non-zero to recover
the input x. This naturally motivates us to think that pruning may helps preserve privacy.
6 Conclusions
This paper has presented a theoretical result to show that, if a fully-connected layer of a neural net-
work is wide enough, magnitude-based neural network pruning is equivalent to adding differentially
private noise.
To understand the gap between the theory and practice, the paper reports experimental results,
in a synthetic setting with a realistic differential privacy budget, that the width of the neural network
needs to be only a few hundreds in order to make the theoretical equivalence hold.
Our experiments with MNIST and CIFAR-10 show that, with the same target accuracy, mag-
nitude pruning preserves more privacy than adding random noise (the classical way to provide
differential privacy) to neural network.
These results have strong practical implications for two reasons. First, since neural network
pruning has the property that sparsity can be quite high (e.g. > 90%) without reducing inference
accuracy, it strongly suggests that network pruning can be an effective method to achieve differential
privacy without any or much reduction of accuracy. Second, although the result is for a single layer
of a neural network, it is quite natural in a distributed or federated learning system to use a
particular layer to communicate among multiple sites.
Several questions remain open. First, Theorem 3.2 is only for a single-layer fully connected net-
work, and it would be interesting if one can extend it to multi-layer settings and also convolutional
neural networks.
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Second, our theoretical finding is based on the worst case analysis, which means in most cases,
m can be much smaller. How to efficiently determine m for different settings requires more inves-
tigation.
Third, this paper has used several similarity measures as metrics for privacy leakage in the
absence of true privacy leakage measure. How to quantify privacy leakage is a challenging question.
Finally, in order to use network pruning as a mechanism to preserve privacy in a practical
distributed or federated learning system, one needs to consider many design details including which
layers to prune, whether or not to prune layers with the same sparsity, where the work of pruning
should be performed, and how to coordinate among multiple sites.
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A Probability tools
In this section we present a number of classical probability tools used in the proof. Lemma A.1
(Chernoff), A.2 (Hoeffding) and A.3 (Bernstein) are about tail bounds for random scalar variables.
Lemma A.5 and Lemma A.4 state two standard results for random Gaussian variable. Lemma A.6
is a probability for Chi-square distribution. Finally, Lemma A.7 is a concentration result on random
matrices.
We state the classical Chernoff bound which is named after Herman Chernoff but due to Herman
Rubin. It gives exponentially decreasing bounds on tail distributions of sums of independent random
variables.
Lemma A.1 (Chernoff bound [Che52]). Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi, where Xi = 1 with probability pi and
Xi = 0 with probability 1− pi, and all Xi are independent. Let µ = E[X] =
∑n
i=1 pi. Then
1. Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ exp(−δ2µ/3), ∀δ > 0 ;
2. Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µ] ≤ exp(−δ2µ/2), ∀0 < δ < 1.
We state the Hoeffding bound:
Lemma A.2 (Hoeffding bound [Hoe63]). Let X1, · · · , Xn denote n independent bounded variables
in [ai, bi]. Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi, then we have
Pr[|X − E[X]| ≥ t] ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2t
2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
.
We state the Bernstein inequality:
Lemma A.3 (Bernstein inequality [Ber24]). Let X1, · · · , Xn be independent zero-mean random
variables. Suppose that |Xi| ≤M almost surely, for all i. Then, for all positive t,
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi > t
]
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2∑n
j=1 E[X2j ] +Mt/3
)
.
We state two bounds for Gaussian random variable:
Lemma A.4 (folklore). Let X ∼ N (0, σ2), then for all t ≥ 0, we have
Pr[X ≥ t] ≤ exp(−t2/2σ2).
Lemma A.5 (folklore). Let X ∼ N (0, σ2), that is, the probability density function of X is given
by φ(x) = 1√
2piσ2
e−
x2
2σ2 . Then
Pr[|X| ≤ t] ≤ 4
5
t
σ
.
We state a tool for Chi-square distribution:
Lemma A.6 (Lemma 1 on page 1325 of Laurent and Massart [LM00]). Let X ∼ X 2k be a chi-
squared distributed random variable with k degrees of freedom. Each one has zero mean and σ2
variance. Then
Pr[X − kσ2 ≥ (2
√
kt+ 2t)σ2] ≤ exp(−t),
Pr[kσ2 −X ≥ 2
√
ktσ2] ≤ exp(−t).
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Matrix concentration inequalities have a large number of applications, for more details, we refer
the readers to a survey by Tropp [Tro15]. Recently, there are several non-trivial generalizations,
e.g., Expander walk [GLSS18, NRR19], Strongly Rayleigh distributions [KS18], and matrix Poincare
inequality [ABY19]. Here, we state matrix Bernstein inequality, which can be thought of as a matrix
generalization of Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.7 (Matrix Bernstein, Theorem 6.1.1 in [Tro15]). Consider a set of m i.i.d. matrices
{X1, · · · , Xm} ⊂ Rn1×n2. Assume that
E[Xi] = 0, ∀i ∈ [m] and ‖Xi‖ ≤M,∀i ∈ [m].
Let X =
∑m
i=1Xi. Let Var[X] be the matrix variance statistic of sum:
Var[X] = max
{∥∥∥ m∑
i=1
E[XiX>i ]
∥∥∥, ∥∥∥ m∑
i=1
E[X>i Xi]
∥∥∥} .
Then
E[‖X‖] ≤ (2Var[X] · log(n1 + n2))1/2 +M · log(n1 + n2)/3.
Furthermore, for all t ≥ 0,
Pr[‖X‖ ≥ t] ≤ (n1 + n2) · exp
(
− t
2/2
Var[X] +Mt/3
)
.
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B Application of concentration inequality
B.1 Application of concentration inequality, truncated Gaussian
Lemma B.1 (Inner product between two vectors). Let a > 0. Let u1, · · · , ud denote i.i.d. random
variables satisfying ∀i ∈ [d] ui = yi · zi where yi ∼ N (0, σ2) and
zi =
{
1, |yi| ≤ a;
0, |yi| > a.
Then, for any fixed vector x ∈ Rd, for any failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1/10), we have
Pr
u
[|〈u, x〉| ≥ 10‖x‖2a(
√
a/σ + 1) log(1/δ)] ≤ δ.
Proof. First, we can compute can E[ui]
E[ui] = E[ui] = 0.
Second, we can upper bound E[(ui)2] using Lemma A.5
E[(ui)2] = E[u2i ]
≤ a2 · Pr[|ui| ≤ a]
≤ a2 · 4
5
a
σ
≤ a3/σ.
Third, we can upper bound |uixi| by a · ‖x‖∞.
Using Bernstein inequality, we have
Pr[|〈u, x〉| ≥ t] ≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
‖x‖22 E[u2i ] + a‖x‖∞t/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
‖x‖22a3/σ + a‖x‖∞t/3
)
.
Choosing
t = 5‖x‖2a1.5σ−0.5
√
log(1/δ) + 5‖x‖∞a log(1/δ)
gives us
Pr[|〈u, x〉| ≥ 10‖x‖2a(
√
a/σ + 1) log(1/δ)] ≤ δ.
Lemma B.2 (Matrix vector multiplication). Let a > 0. Let Ai,j denote i.i.d. random variables
satisfying ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [d]. Ai,j = yi,j · zi,j where yi,j ∼ N (0, σ2) and
zi,j =
{
1, |yi,j | ≤ a;
0, |yi,j | > a.
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Then, for any fixed vector x ∈ Rd, for any failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1/10), we have
Pr
A
[
|‖Ax‖22 − E[‖Ax‖22]| ≥ 1000m‖x‖22(σ2 + a2) log3(m/δ)
]
≤ δ.
Further, if m = Ω(−2‖x‖22(1 + a2/σ2) log3(m/δ)),
Pr
A
[ 1
m
∣∣‖Ax‖22 − E[‖Ax‖22]∣∣ ≥ 2‖x‖22σ2] ≤ δ.
Proof. We define random variable bi = (Ax)
2
i . We can upper bound E[bi]
E[bi] = E[(Ax)2i ] ≤ ‖x‖22 · a3/σ.
Similarly,
E[bi] = E[(Ax)2i ] ≥ 0.1‖x‖22 · a3/σ.
Next, we want to upper bound E[b2i ], for simplicity, let u denote the i-th row of matrix A,
E[b2i ]− (E[bi])2 = E[〈u, x〉4]− (E[〈u, x〉2])2
= E
[
(
d∑
i=1
uixi)
4
]
−
(
E
[
(
d∑
i=1
uixi)
2
])2
.
For the first term, we have
E
[
(
d∑
i=1
uixi)
4
]
= E
[ d∑
i=1
u4ix
4
i
]
+ 3E
[ d∑
i=1
∑
j∈[d]\{i}
u2ix
2
iu
2
jx
2
j
]
≤ E[u4i ] · ‖x‖44 + 3(E[u2i ])2 · ‖x‖42
≤ 4E[u4i ] · ‖x‖42.
For the second term, we have(
E
[
(
d∑
i=1
uixi)
2
])2
=
( d∑
i=1
E[u2i ]x2i
)2
= (E[u2i ])2 · ‖x‖42.
Thus, we have
E[b2i ]− (E[bi])2 ≤ 4E[u4i ] · ‖x‖42 ≤ 64σ4‖x‖42.
We also need to upper bound |bi|. Apply Lemma B.1, we have, for a fixed i ∈ [m],
|bi| ≤ (10‖x‖2a(
√
a/σ + 1) log(m/δ))2 := bmax
holds with probability at least 1− δ/m.
Taking a union bound over m coordinates, with probability 1 − δ, we have : for all i ∈ [m],
|bi| ≤ bmax.
Applying Bernstein inequality (Lemma A.3) on
∑m
i=1 bi again
Pr
[∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
(bi − E[bi])
∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ exp(− t2/2∑m
i=1 Var[bi] + bmaxt/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
64mσ4‖x‖42 + bmaxt/3
)
.
Choosing t = 50mσ2‖x‖22 log(1/δ) + 50mbmax log(1/δ), we complete the proof.
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B.2 Application of concentration inequalities, classical random Gaussian
Lemma B.3 (Inner product between a random guassian vector and a fixed vector). Let a > 0.
Let u1, · · · , ud denote i.i.d. random guassian variables where ui ∼ N (0, σ21).
Then, for any fixed vector e ∈ Rd, for any failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1/10), we have
Pr
u
[
|〈u, e〉| ≥ 2σ1‖e‖2
√
log(d/δ) + σ1‖e‖∞ log1.5(d/δ)
]
≤ δ.
Proof. First, we can compute E[ui]
E[ui] = E[ui] = 0.
Second, we can compute E[(ui)2]
E[(ui)2] = E[u2i ] = σ21.
Third, we can upper bound |ui| and |uiei|.
Pr
u
[|ui − E[ui]| ≥ t1] ≤ exp
(
− t
2
1
2σ21
)
.
Take t1 =
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1, then for each fixed i ∈ [d], we have, |ui| ≤
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1 holds with
probability 1− δ/d.
Taking a union bound over d coordinates, with probability 1 − δ, we have : for all i ∈ [d],
|ui| ≤
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1.
Let E1 denote the event that, maxi∈[d] |uiei| is upper bounded by
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1‖e‖∞. Pr[E1] ≥
1− δ.
Using Bernstein inequality, we have
Pr
u
[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t] ≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
‖e‖22 E[u2i ] + maxi∈[d] |uiei| · t/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
‖e‖22σ21 +
√
2 log(d/δ)σ1‖e‖∞ · t/3
)
≤ δ,
where the second step follows from Pr[E1] ≥ 1 − δ and E[u2i ] = σ21, and the last step follows from
choice of t:
t = 2σ1‖e‖2
√
log(d/δ) + σ1‖e‖∞ log1.5(d/δ).
Taking a union with event E1, we have
Pr[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t] ≤ 2δ.
Rescaling δ completes the proof.
Lemma B.4 (Inner product between two random guassian vectors). Let a > 0. Let u1, · · · , ud
denote i.i.d. random Gaussian variables where ui ∼ N (0, σ21) and e1, · · · , ed denote i.i.d. random
Gaussian variables where ei ∼ N (0, σ22)
Then, for any failure probability δ ∈ (0, 1/10), we have
Pr
u,e
[
|〈u, e〉| ≥ 104σ1σ2
√
d log2(d/δ)
]
≤ δ.
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Proof. First, using Lemma A.6, we compute the upper bound for ‖e‖22
Pr
e
[‖e‖22 − dσ22 ≥ (2
√
dt+ 2t)σ22] ≤ exp(−t).
Take t = log(1/δ), then with probability 1− δ,
‖e‖22 ≤ (d+ 3
√
d log(1/δ) + 2 log(1/δ))σ22 ≤ 4d log(1/δ)σ22.
Thus
Pr
e
[‖e‖2 ≤ 4
√
d log(1/δ)σ2] ≥ 1− δ.
Second, we compute the upper bound for ‖e‖∞ (the proof is similar to Lemma B.3)
Pr
e
[|‖e‖∞ ≤
√
log(d/δ)σ2] ≥ 1− δ.
We define t and t′ as follows
t = 4 · (σ1‖e‖2
√
log(d/δ) + σ1‖e‖∞ log1.5(d/δ))
t′ = 8 · (σ1σ2
√
d log(d/δ) + σ1σ2 log
2(d/δ)).
From the above calculations, we can show
Pr
e
[t′ ≥ t] ≥ 1− 2δ.
By Lemma B.3, for fixed e, we have
Pr
u
[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t] ≤ δ.
Overall, we have
Pr
e,u
[|〈u, e〉| ≥ t′] ≤ 3δ.
Rescaling δ completes the proof.
Lemma B.5 (Concentration of folded Gaussian). Let matrix A ∈ Rm×d be defined as each entry
is i.i.d. random variables satisfying ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [d]. Ai,j = yi,j where yi,j ∼ N (0, σ2A). Let
A ∈ Rm×d be defined as, ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [d], Ai,j = yi,j · zi,j where
zi,j =
{
1, if 0 ≤ yi,j ≤ a;
0, otherwise .
Let x ∈ Rd+ denote a non-negative vector where
∑d
i=1 xi = 1.
1) For any failure possibility δ ∈ (0, 1/10), we have
Pr
[∀i ∈ [m], (A¯x)i ≥ σA · C] > 1− δ,
where
C :=
a2
6σ2A
− ( 2a
3
9σ3A
)1/2 ·
√
log(m/δ)− 2a
3σA
· log(m/δ).
2) For any failure possibility δ ∈ (0, 1/10), if a/σA ≥ 20 log(m/δ), then
Pr
[∀i ∈ [m], (A¯x)i ≥ σA · 0.02 · (a2/σ2A)] > 1− δ.
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Proof. For a fixed i ∈ [m], for each j ∈ [d], we define
bj = A¯i,jxj .
We first calculate E[bj ], E[b2j ] and Var[bj ].
We provide a lower bound for E[bj ],
E[bj ] = E[Ai,j ]xj
= xj
∫ a
0
1
σA
√
2pi
exp(−x/σ2A)xdx
≥ a
2xj
2σA
√
2pi
≥ a
2xj
6σA
.
We give an upper bound for E[b2j ],
E[b2j ] = E[A2i,j ]x2j
= x2j
∫ a
0
1
σA
√
2pi
exp(−x/σ2A)x2dx
≤ a
3x2j
3σA
√
2pi
≤ a
3x2j
9σA
.
We can upper bound Var[bj ],
Var[bj ] =E[b2j ]− E[bj ]2 ≤ E[b2j ] ≤
a3x2j
9σA
.
Then, we can lower bound
∑d
j=1 E[bj ]
d∑
j=1
E[bj ] ≥ a
2
6σA
d∑
j=1
xj =
a2
6σA
,
where the last step follows from
∑d
j=1 xj = 1.
Next, we can upper bound bj and
∑d
j=1 Var[bj ]
M := max
j∈[d]
bj ≤ max
j∈[d]
xja ≤ a.
d∑
j=1
Var[bj ] ≤
d∑
j=1
a3x2j
9σA
≤
d∑
j=1
a3xj
9σA
=
a3
9σA
.
Applying Bernstein inequality (Lemma A.3) on
∑d
j=1(bj − E[bj ])
Pr
[ d∑
j=1
(bj − E[bj ]) ≤ −t
]
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2∑d
j=1 Var[bj ] +Mt/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
a3/9σA + at/3
)
.
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Taking
t = σA · (
√
2a3/9σ3A · log(m/δ) + 2a/3σA · log(m/δ)),
then for any i ∈ [m],
Pr
[ d∑
j=1
bj ≥ a2/(6σA)− t
]
≥ Pr
[ d∑
j=1
bj ≥
d∑
j=1
E[bj ]− t
]
≥ 1− δ,
where the first step holds because
∑d
j=1 E[bj ] > a2/(6σA).
Since (A¯x)i =
∑d
j=1 bj , we have for any i ∈ [m],
Pr
[
(A¯x)i ≥ σA ·
(
a2/6σ2A −
√
(2a3/9σ3A) · log(m/δ)− (2a/3σA) · log(m/δ)
)]
> 1− δ/m.
Taking a union bound over all i ∈ [m] completes the proof.
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C Anti-concentration
Given a number of independent random variables, the well-known Central Limit Theorem (CLT)
states that their sum has good concentration under certain conditions. Such concentration results
like the Chernoff bound [Che52] and Hoeffding’s inequality [Hoe63] are among the central tools
in Theoretical Computer Science (TCS). From the opposite perspective, we can also ask for anti-
concentration results. For example, let x be a Rademacher variable (choosing ±1 with probability
1/2) and let a denote a vector in Rd. The celebrated Littlewood-Offord Lemma states that any
d-variate degree-1 polynomial p(x) =
∑d
i=1 aixi does not concentrate on any particular value.
Theorem C.1 (Littlewood and Offord [LO43]). Let C > 0 denote a universal constant. For any
linear form p satisfying |ai| ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ [d], and any open interval I of length 1, we have
Pr
x∼{−1,+1}d
[p(x) ∈ I] ≤ C · log d√
d
.
Two years later, Erdo¨s [Erd45] removed the log d factor in Theorem C.1. Recently, Theorem C.1
has been generalized to higher degree polynomials by [CTV06, RV13, MNV17].
Instead of considering xi as {−1,+1} random variables, Carbery and Wright [CW01] showed
the anti-concentration result for xi chosen as i.i.d. Gaussians.
Theorem C.2 (Carbery and Wright [CW01]). Let p : Rd → R denote a degree-k polynomial with
d variables. There is a universal constant C > 0 such that
Pr
x∼N (0,Id)
[
|p(x)| ≤ δ
√
Var[p(x)]
]
≤ C · δ1/k.
These are worst-case results in the sense that they hold for arbitrary polynomials. For example,
Theorem C.2 is tight for any polynomial that is a perfect k-th power.
We can generalize Theorem C.2 into the following1:
Lemma C.3 (An variation of [CW01], Anti-concentration of sum of truncated Gaussians). Let
x1, · · · , xn be n i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables N (0, 1). Let p : Rn → R denote a
degree-1 polynomial defined as
p(x1, · · · , xn) =
n∑
i=1
αixi.
Let f denote a truncation function where f(x) = x if |x| ≤ a, and f(x) = 0 if |x| > a. Then we
have
Pr
x∼N (0,Id)
[
|p(f(x))| ≤ min{a, 0.1} · δ · ‖α‖2
]
≥ C · δ.
Proof. Let µ : Rn → R≥0 be the truncated Gaussian distribution. We first argue that µ is log-
concave. Indeed, for any x, y ∈ Rn and λ ∈ [0, 1], if µ(x) = 0 or µ(y) = 0, then we must have
µ(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ 0 = (µ(x))λ · (µ(y))1−λ.
On the other hand, if µ(x) > 0 and µ(y) > 0, then we must have µ(λx+ (1− λ)y) > 0, because
‖λx+ (1− λ)y‖2 ≤ λ‖x‖2 + (1− λ)‖y‖2,
1The generalization also has been observed in [SYZ20], for the completeness, we provide the proof here.
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hence µ would not truncate at λx + (1 − λ)y. Notice that Gaussian distribution is log-concave.
Let µ′ : Rn → R be the density function of Gaussian distribution, then µ(x) = C0 · µ′(x) for some
universal constant C0 > 0 for all x that is not truncated. so in this case we still have
µ(λx+ (1− λ)y) = C0 · µ′(λx+ (1− λ)y)
≥ C0 · (µ′(x))λ · (µ′(y))1−λ
= (C0µ
′(x))λ · (C0µ′(y))1−λ
= (µ(x))λ · (µ(y))1−λ.
So we conclude that µ is log-concave.
Now we apply Theorem C.5 on µ and p. By setting q = 2 and d = 1, we have(∫
x∈Rn
|p(x)|2dµ
)1/2 · µ(|p(x)| ≤ α) ≤ C · α. (1)
Notice that ∫
x∈Rn
|p(x)|2dµ = E
x∼µ
[( n∑
i=1
αixi
)2]
=
n∑
i=1
α2i Ex∼µ[x
2
i ]
=
n∑
i=1
α2i Varxi∼µi
[xi],
where µi : R→ R is the distribution on the i-th coordinate, ∀i ∈ [n]. Hence we can rewrite Eq. (1)
as
Pr
x∼N (0,Id)
∣∣∣ n∑
i=1
αif(xi)
∣∣∣ ≤ δ( n∑
i=1
α2i Varxi∼µi
[xi]
)1/2 ≥ C · δ.
By Claim C.4, we have
Pr
x∼N (0,Id)
|p(f(x))| ≤ δ( n∑
i=1
α2i ·
(
1−
√
2
pi
· a · e
−a2/2
erf(a/
√
2)
))1/2 ≥ C · δ.
For 0 ≤ a 1,
1−
√
2
pi
· a · e
−a2/2
erf(a/
√
2)
=
5
6
a2 + o(a3).
Hence,
Pr
x∼N (0,Id)
[
|p(f(x))| ≤ δa‖α‖2
]
≥ C · δ.
For a ≥ 1,
1−
√
2
pi
· a · e
−a2/2
erf(a/
√
2)
= Θ
(
1− ae−a2 − e−a2/2/a
)
.
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Hence,
Pr
x∼N (0,Id)
[
|p(f(x))| ≤ δ(1− ae−a2 − e−a2/2/a)1/2‖α‖2
]
≥ C · δ.
When a ≥ 1, we have 0.025 ≤ (1 − ae−a2 − e−a2/2/a) ≤ 1. So we can combine the above two
cases to get
Pr
x∼N (0,Id)
[
|p(f(x))| ≤ min{a, 0.1} · δ‖α‖2
]
≥ C · δ.
Claim C.4. Let x ∈ R be a standard Gaussian random variable N (0, 1). Let f denote a truncation
function where f(x) = x if |x| ≤ a, and f(x) = 0 if |x| > a. Then, we have
Var[f(x)] = 1−
√
2
pi
· a · e
−a2/2
erf(a/
√
2)
,
where erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0 e
−t2dt.
Theorem C.5 ([AK18]). Let µ : Rn → R be a log-concave measure over Rn. Let L1(µ) =∫
x∈Rn |µ(x)|dx. For any q > 0 and polynomial p : Rn → R, define the `q norm of p with respect to
the measure µ as
‖p‖q =
(∫
pqdµ
)1/q
.
Assume p has degree d. Then there exists constant C(d) > 0 that only depends on d so that for all
α > 0 and all q > 0, (∫
|p(x)|q/ddµ
)1/q · µ(|p(x)| ≤ α) ≤ C(d) · α1/d.
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D Sensitivity
D.1 Concentration of folded Gaussian
Lemma D.1 (concentration of folded gaussian). Let matrix A ∈ Rm×d be defined as each entry
is i.i.d. random variables satisfying ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [d]. Ai,j = yi,j where yi,j ∼ N (0, σ2A). Let
zi,j = |yi,j |, then ∀j ∈ [d],
Pr
[ m∑
i=1
zi,j − E[zi,j ] > σAm+ 4σA
√
m log1.5(md/δ)
]
≤ δ.
Proof. For a fixed j, let bi = zi,j . First we calculate E[bi]
E[bi] =
∫ ∞
0
2√
2piσ2A
exp(−x2/2σ2A)xdx
= σA
√
2/pi.
Second, we calculate E[b2i ]
E[b2i ] = E[z2i,j ] = E[y2i,j ] = σ2A.
According to Lemma A.4, we can upper bound zi,j
Pr[zi,j > t] = Pr[|yi,j | > t] ≤ exp(−t/δ22).
Taking t = σA
√
log(md/δ1) := M , we have ∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [d]
Pr[max
i,j
zi,j > t] ≤ δ2.
Applying Bernstein inequality on
∑m
i=1 bi
Pr
[∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
(bi − E[bi])
∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ exp(− t2/2∑m
i=1 Var[bi] + bmaxt/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
mσ2A + σAt
√
log(md/δ2)/3
)
.
Choosing t = σAm+ 4σA
√
m log1.5(md/δ), we have
Pr
[ m∑
i=1
zi,j − E[zi,j ] > t
]
≤ δ.
D.2 `1-sensitivity functions of single layer neural network
Lemma D.2 (`1-norm sensitivity of single layer neural network). Let x ∈ [0, 1]d, fully connected
matrix A ∈ N (0, σA)m×d, bias matrix b ∈ Rm, and φ is the ReLU activation function. Let f(x) =
φ(Ax + b) denote a single layer network, then for all neighboring inputs x1, x2 ∈ Rd that differ at
most in one entry, we have
Pr
[
GS1(f) ≤ σAm+ 4σA
√
m log1.5(md/δ)
]
≥ 1− δ.
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Proof. Let k denote the index that x1 and x2 are different.
GS1(f) = sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖f(x1)− f(x2)‖1
= sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖φ(Ax1 + b)− φ(Ax2 + b)‖1
≤ sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖(Ax1 + b)− (Ax2 + b)‖1
= sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖(A(x1 − x2)‖1
= ‖A∗,k‖1
≤ σAm+ 4σA
√
m log1.5(md/δ),
where the fourth step follows that x1 and x2 differ in the k-th entry, and the fifth step follows
Lemma D.1.
D.3 `2-sensitivity functions of single layer neural network
Lemma D.3 (`2-norm sensitivity of single layer neural network). Let x ∈ [0, 1]d, fully connected
matrix A ∈ N (0, σA)m×d, bias matrix b ∈ Rm, and φ is the ReLU activation function. Let f(x) =
φ(Ax + b) denote a single layer network, then for all neighboring inputs x1, x2 ∈ Rd that differ at
most in one entry, we have
Pr
[
GS2(f) ≤ 2(
√
md+
√
log(1/δ))
]
≥ 1− δ.
Proof. Let k denote the index that x1 and x2 are different.
GS2(f) = sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖f(x1)− f(x2)‖2
= sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖φ(Ax1 + b)− φ(Ax2 + b)‖2
≤ sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖(Ax1 + b)− (Ax2 + b)‖2
= sup
x1,x2∈Rd
‖(A(x1 − x2)‖2
= ‖A∗,k‖2
≤ σA
(
2
√
md log(1/δ) + 2 log(1/δ) +md
)1/2
≤ σA
(
2
√
2md log(1/δ) + 2 log(1/δ) +md
)1/2
= σA(
√
md+
√
2 log 1/δ),
where the fourth step follows that x1 and x2 differ in the k-th entry, and the fifth step follows
Lemma A.6.
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Table 1: Summary of two results
Statement dp Comment Pruning
Theorem E.1 GS1(f)/(σσA) · (m/δdp) General x Magnitude
Theorem E.2 GS1(f)/(σσA) · log(m/δdp) Nonnegative x Folded Magnitude
E Equivalence between pruning and differential privacy
E.1 Main results
Theorem E.1 (Main result I). For a single layer neural network f(x) = φ(Ax + b) where fully
connected matrix A ∈ N (0, σ2A)m×d, vector b ∈ Rm, and φ is the ReLU activation function. We
assume all the inputs x ∈ Rd satisfying that ‖x‖2 = 1. If
m = Ω(poly(−1ap , log(1/δap), log(1/δdp), a/σA, σσA)),
then applying magnitude pruning with with truncation threshold a > 0 on A ∈ Rm×d is an (ap, δap)-
approximation to applying (dp, δdp)-differential privacy on x, where
dp = 2GS1(f)(m/δdp)/(σσA).
Theorem E.2 (Main result II). For a single layer network f(x) = φ(Ax+ b) where fully connected
matrix A ∈ N (0, σ2A)m×d, vector b ∈ Rm, and φ is the ReLU activation function. We assume all
the inputs x ∈ Rd satisfying that ‖x‖2 = 1 and x ∈ Rd+. If
m = Ω(poly(−1ap , log(1/δap), log(1/δdp), a/σA, σσA)),
then applying folded magnitude pruning with truncation threshold a > 0 on A ∈ Rm×d is an
(ap, δap)-approximation to applying (dp, δdp)-differential privacy on x ∈ Rd, where
dp = 2GS1(f) log(m/δdp)/(σσA).
Remark E.3. Note that GS1(f) = Θ(mσA).
1) if using folded Gaussian and assume x ∈ R≥0, dp = 2GS1(f) · log(m/δdp)/(σσA),
then we need to pick σ = m, σA = Θ(1/σ) and a = Θ(σA) .
2) if using Gaussian, dp = 2GS1(f) · (m/δdp)/(σσA),
then we need to pick σ = m2, σA = Θ(1/σ) and a = Θ(σA).
E.2 Differential privacy
Definition E.4 (Differential Privacy, Definition.1 in [DMNS06]). Let A : Dn → Y be a randomized
algorithm. Let D1, D2 ∈ Dn be two databases that differ in at most one entry (we call these databases
neighbors). Let  > 0. Define A to be  -differentially private if for all neighboring databases D1, D2,
and for all (measurable) subsets Y ⊂ Y, we have
Pr [A(D1) ∈ Y ]
Pr [A (D2) ∈ Y ] ≤ exp().
Definition E.5 (Global Sensitivity, Definition 2 in [DMNS06]). Let f : Dn → Rd, define GSp(f),
the `p global sensitivity of f , for all neighboring databases D1, D2 as
GSp(f) = sup
D1,D2∈Dn
‖f(D1)− f(D2)‖p.
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Theorem E.6 (Laplace Mechanism [DMNS06]). Let f be defined as before and  > 0. Define
randomized algorithm A as
A(D) = f(D) + (Lap(GS1(f)/))d,
where the one-dimensional (zero mean) Laplace distribution Lap(b) has density p(x; b) = 12b exp(− |x|b ),
and Lap(b)d = (l1, . . . , ld) ∈ Rd where each li i.i.d. is sampled from Lap(b). Then A is -
differentially private.
Theorem E.7 (Gaussian Mechanism [DR14]). For c > 2
√
log(1/δ), the Gaussian Mechanism with
parameter σ ≥ c ·GS2(f)/ is (, δ)-differentially private.
E.3 Function approximation
Definition E.8 ((, δ)-approximation). For a pair of functions f(x) and g(x), we say f is an
(, δ)-approximation of g if for any x
Pr[‖f(x)− g(x)‖2 > ] ≤ δ.
E.4 Proof of Theorem E.2
Proof. Sketch.
The proof can be splitted into two parts. We use A˜ ∈ Rm×d to denote the weight matrix after
magnitude pruning, and A¯ = A˜−A ∈ Rm×d. We define vector e ∈ Rm as follows
e = Lap(1, σ)m ◦ (A¯x).
1. Let B(x) = f(x) + e ∈ Rm, then B(x) is (dp, δdp)-differential privacy.
2. Pr[ 1√
m
‖e− A¯x‖2 ≥ ap] ≤ δap, as long as m = Ω(poly(−1ap , log(1/δap), a/σA, σσA)).
Part 1.
Let y ∈ Rm and x1, x2 be neighbouring inputs. It is sufficient to bound the ratio p(y−f(x1))p(y−f(x2))
where p(·) denotes probability density, because once the densities are bounded, integrating p(·)
yields the requirement for differential privacy as defined in E.2.
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Since ei ∼ Lap(1, σ) · (A¯x)i, then p(t : σ) = 12σ exp(−|t/(A¯x)i − 1|/σ)
p(y − f(x1))
p(y − f(x2)) =
∏m
i=1
1
2σ exp(−|(yi − f(x1)i)/(A¯x1)i − 1|/σ)∏m
i=1
1
2σ exp(−|(yi − f(x2)i)/(A¯x2)i − 1|/σ)
=
exp(−∑mi=1 |(yi − f(x1)i)/(A¯x1)i − 1|/σ)
exp(−∑mi=1 |(yi − f(x2)i)/(A¯x2)i − 1|/σ)
= exp
( 1
σ
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣yi − f(x1)i
(A¯x1)i
− 1
∣∣∣− ∣∣∣yi − f(x2)i
(A¯x2)i
− 1
∣∣∣)
≤ exp
( 1
σ
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣yi − f(x1)i
(A¯x1)i
− yi − f(x2)i
(A¯x2)i
∣∣∣)
≤ exp
(
2
m∑
i=1
1
σmini∈[m]{|(A¯x1)i|, |(A¯x2)i|}
|f(x2)i − f(x1)i|
)
≤ exp
(
2GS1(f)/σ min
i∈[m]
{|(A¯x1)i|, |(A¯x2)i|}
)
≤ exp
(
2GS1(f)/σAσ(1/6 · (a/σA)2 − 1/5 · (a/σA)1.5 log(m/δdp))
)
≤ exp
(
2(σAm+ 4σA
√
m log1.5(md/δ))/σAσ(1/6 · (a/σA)2 − 1/5 · (a/σA)1.5 log(m/δdp))
)
≤ exp
(
2(m+ 4
√
m log1.5(md/δ))/σ(1/6 · (a/σA)2 − 1/5 · (a/σA)1.5 log(m/δdp))
)
where the first equality is because the noise is independent for each coordinate, and the first
inequality is triangle inequality. The third inequality holds because of the definition of GS1(f), and
the fourth holds because of Lemma B.5. holds with probability 1− δdp
According to Lemma D.2,
Pr
[
GS1(f) ≤ σAm+ 4σA
√
m log1.5(md/δ)
]
≥ 1− δ.
Part 2.
Let zi = (ei − A¯xi)2, thus zi ∼ Lap2(0, bi), where bi = σ(A¯x)i We first calculate E[z2i ]
E[z2i ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
1
2bi
exp(−|x|/bi)x4dx
=
∫ ∞
0
1
bi
exp(−x/bi)x4dx
= b4i · (− exp(−x)x4 −
∫ ∞
0
−4 exp(−x)x3dx)
∣∣∣∣∞
0
= b4i · (− exp(−x)x4 + 4(− exp(−x)x3 − 3(exp(−x)x2 − 2(− exp(−x)x− exp(−x)))))|∞0
= 24b4i
≤ 24σ4 · (10a(
√
a/σA + 1) log(m/δ))
4,
where both the third step and the fourth step follow integration by parts. The fifth step follows by
plugging in the limits of integration, and the last step follows by Lemma B.1.
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Next, we want to bound max(zi), since zi = e
2
i ∼ Lap2(0, bi)
Pr[zi ≥ t2] = Pr[|ei| ≥ t] t > 0
=2 · 1
2
exp(−t/bi)
= exp(−t/bi),
where the second step follows by plugging the cumulative distribution function of Laplace distri-
bution.
Take t = bi log(m/δ), then for each fixed i ∈ [m], we have Pr[zi ≤
√
bi log(m/δ)] = δ/m. Thus,
with probability 1− δ, we have for all i ∈ [m],
zi ≤ max
i∈[m]
√
bi log(m/δ) ≤
√
a3σ/σA · log(m/δ) := M,
where the second inequality follows by (A¯x)i’s upper bound in Lemma B.2.
Using Bernstein inequality, we have
Pr
[∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
(zi − E[zi])
∣∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ exp(− t2/2∑m
i=1 E[z2i ] +Mt/3
)
≤ exp
(
− t
2/2
24mσ4 · (10a(√a/σA + 1) log(m/δ))4 + a3σ/σA · log(m/δ)t/3
)
.
Since Mt/3 is dominated by
∑m
i=1 E[z2i ], we choose
t = m2,
then as long as
m ≥ −4 log(1/δ)
(
48 · (10a/σA(
√
a/σA + 1) log(m/δ))
4
)
(σ4σ4A + σσ
2
A),
we have
Pr
[
1
m
∣∣∣ m∑
i=1
(zi − E[zi])
∣∣∣ ≥ 2] ≤ δ.
which is
Pr
[
1√
m
‖e− A¯x‖2 ≥ 
]
≤ δ.
Note that we need to pick σ = m, then we need to pick σA = 1/m.
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F Experiment details
F.1 Network architecture and hyperparameters
Table 2 provides implementation details of the deep neural networks we use in experiments. Most
of our experiments are conducted on 8 Nvidia Tesla K80 GPUs. Experiment scripts are written in
Python 3.6.
Table 2: Implementation details of network architectures and training schemes.
MNIST [LCB10] CIFAR-10 [Kri09]
#Epoch 20 200
Network architecture LeNet-5 [LBBH98] VGG-19 [SZ15]
Optimizer SGD (momentum = 0.9) [Qia99] Adam [KB15]
Initial learning rate 0.1 0.001
Batch size 64 64
F.2 Pruning algorithm
Algorithm 2 provides the full version of Algorithm 1. The pruning procedure decides a(t), the
magnitude threshold at time t, by the gradual pruning technique [ZG17], which we have discussed
in Section 4 (see Figure 4).
F.3 Visualization of inverted images
Inversion from different layers. Figure 9 and Figure 10 visualize the inverted images obtained
by running the attack (see Section 4.2) on Φ′prune from different layers with different target sparsities
of magnitude pruning. Each column implies the increasing difficulty of inverting deeper layers. Each
row indicates that with a given layer, running inversion to generate x becomes harder as the model
is pruned with a higher target sparsity. As shown, for layer ‘Conv5’ in LeNet-5, if we prune the
model with sparsity 0.9, then the attack fails by producing an almost all-black inversion. Similar
phenomenon is observed when inverting layer ‘Conv5-1’ in VGG-19 with sparsity 0.9.
Inversion from the same layer. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show inverted images obtained by run-
ning multiple inversion attacks on the same layer (we show one sample from each class). Increasing
the target sparsity of pruning makes the inversion attack harder for all classes.
F.4 More on relative privacy leakage of pruning and adding noise
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the privacy leakage differences between magnitude-based pruning and
adding differentially private noise for the experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively (full
version of Figure 6 and Figure 7). As shown, given the same accuracy requirement, pruning helps
preserve more privacy than adding noise. When accuracy decreases from 0.9 to 0.1, the similarity
curves of pruning and adding noise ‘converge’. This is because when the majority of the network
parameters are 0’s, or the hidden-layer output is dominated by the noise, running the inversion
attack will hardly succeed in obtaining information about the original input.
Note that we did not provide the range for INFE similarity results because they all have min-
imum 0 and maximum 1 (even random guessing can make a correct prediction) and thus not
informative.
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Algorithm 2 Stochastic Gradient Descent with Magnitude-based Pruning, detailed version of
Algorithm 1
1: procedure SGDMagPrune({xi, yi}i∈[n], a, η)
2: . Loss function L : Rdo ×Rdo → [0, 1]
3: Let W (1) denote a random initialization of neural network’s weights, and f(W,x) denotes
the neural network.
4: Let D = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)} ⊂ Rd×Rdo
5: for t = 1→ Ttrain do . Training stage
6: Sample (x, y) ∼ D uniformly at random
7: W (t+1) ←W (t) − η · ∂L(f(W,x),y)∂W |W=W (t)
8: end for
9: for t = Ttrain → Ttrain + Tprune do . Pruning stage
10: Sample a data (x, y) from D uniformly at random
11: W˜ (t) ← ThresholdPrune(W (t), a(t))
12: W (t+1) = W˜ (t) − η · ∂L(f(W,x),y)∂W |W=W˜ (t)
13: end for
14: Tend ← Ttrain + Tprune
15: W˜ (Tend) ← ThPrune(W (Tend), a(Tend))
16: end procedure
17: procedure ThPrune(W,a)
18: for l ∈ [L] do
19: for i, j do
20: (W˜l)i,j ←
{
(Wl)i,j , if |(Wl)i,j | > a;
0, otherwise .
21: end for
22: end for
23: return W˜
24: end procedure
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Figure 9: Inverted MNIST digits (a digit 2) from different layers with different sparsity levels. k
stands for sparsity.
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Figure 10: Inverted CIFAR-10 images (a dog) from different layers with different sparsity levels. k
stands for sparsity.
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Figure 11: Inversion from layer ‘Conv5’ of LeNet-5 (MNIST). Each row shows a sample from each
class.
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Figure 12: Inversion from layer ‘Conv5-1’ of VGG-19 (CIFAR-10). Each row shows a sample from
each class.
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Figure 13: Similarity between inversion and original images by applying pruning and adding noise
on different layers (LeNet-5 + MNIST). Shadow represents value range.
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Figure 14: Similarity between inversion and original images by applying pruning and adding noise
on different layers (VGG-19 + CIFAR-10). Shadow represents value range.
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